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CHAPTER 16 
Corporations 
BERTRAM H. LOEWEN BERG 
§16.1. Ultra vires. Two decisions 1 during the 1957 SURVEY year 
indicate that the ancient doctrine of ultra vires, often criticized as no 
longer fashionable 2 and generally believed to be of diminishing im-
portance to practitioners,s still has considerable vitality. 
Except in one or two limited areas there is a fair degree of unanimity 
among American courts 4 both as to what constitutes an ultra vires 
contract and what are the legal consequences arising from such an 
agreement. Thus it is almost universally held both in Massachusetts 
and elsewhere that an ultra vires contract which has been fully exe-
cuted by both parties will be allowed to stand; 5 and, conversely, no 
rights arise under a wholly executory ultra vires agreement.6 The par-
tially executed contract, however, has proved to be a source of con-
flict not only among the several states but frequently decisions in the 
same jurisdiction are difficult to reconcile. Massachusetts 7 and a small 
number of other states 8 have generally followed what used to be called 
the "federal rule," a description rendered obsolete by Erie Railroad 
Co. v. Tompkins.9 Since the "federal rule" was often referred to as 
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§16.I. 1 Wiley & Foss, Inc. v. Saxony Theatres, Inc., 335 Mass. 257, 139 N.E.2d 
400 (1957); Wasserman v. National Gypsum Co., 335 Mass. 240, 139 N.E.2d 410 
(1957). 
2 Magruder, J., dissenting in Herbert v. Sullivan, 123 F.2d 477, 479 (1st Cir. 
1941). 
3 "The phrase 'ultra vires' ... is of far less practical importance today .... 
In [present day] practice, the 'grant of powers' to the corporation consists of ap-
proving a corporate charter written by the attorneys for the incorporators; and 
the charter may include practically any powers and purposes which the incor-
porators or their counsel agree to write into their documents. . . . At all events, 
when a true question of 'ultra vires' is raised under a modern charter, it is generally 
a proof of poor draftsmanship on the part of the incorporating lawyers." Berle 
and Warren, Cases and Materials on the Law of Business Organization (Corpora-
tions) 45-46 (1948). 
4 Stevens, Corporations 317 (2d ed. 1949). 
5 Dome Realty Co. v. Gould, 285 Mass. 294, 189 N.E. 66 (1934); Ballantine, Cor· 
porations §92 (rev. ed. 1946). 
6 Hotcl1kin v. Third National Bank of Syracuse, 219 Mass 234, 106 N.E. 974 
(1914); Ballantine, Corporations §92 (rev. ed. 1946). 
7 Davis v. Old Colony Railroad Co., 131 Mass. 258 (1881). 
8 Ballantine, Corporations §95 (rev. ed. 1946). 
9304 U.s. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938). 
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§16.1 CORPORATIONS 113 
the English doctrine, arising as it did from the influence of Directors 
of The Ashbury Railway Carriage &- Iron Co. v. Riche,10 the latter 
description may be more useful. 
Under this doctrine an ultra vires contract was regarded as void, 
so that no recovery on the contract was permitted even though the 
plaintiff had fully performed his obligations. To prevent unjust en-
richment the court permitted the plaintiff to recover in quasi-contract 
to the extent that he could establish that the defendant had received 
the benefit of his performance.n Quasi-contractual relief, however, 
was often inadequate since frequently, as in the typical ultra vires 
guaranty situation, the insolvent principal rather than the solvent 
guarantor was regarded as the recipient of the benefit of the creditor-
plaintiff's performance,12 An extreme illustration of the inequity of 
the English rule is found in Herbert v. Sullivan,13 a First Circuit Court 
of Appeals decision construing Massachusetts law. In this case a cor-
poration made an ultra vires loan to the executors of an estate who 
signed a note to evidence their debt. Suit on the note was dismissed 
on the ground that the corporation had no power to make such a loan. 
Thus ultra vires, frequently regarded as a shield to protect the corpora-
tion against acts beyond the charter powers, was used as a sword to 
prevent the corporation from recovering money actually lent, merely 
because authority for the loan could not be found in the corporate 
purposes. Trapped by its rigid adherence to what it regarded as 
controlling Massachusetts decisions, the court in a somewhat rueful 
dictum pointed out that quasi-contractual relief would also be denied, 
since the defendants had used the money to pay debts of the estate and 
hence had not benefited individually.14 Judge Magruder in a vigorous 
dissent protested against what he regarded as an unwarranted exten-
sion of the Massachusetts cases,15 
With such a result possible under the classic English rule, it is not 
surprising that the Supreme Judicial Court in its two current deci-
sions was quick to find adequate grounds for rejecting ultra vires as 
a defense to liability. In Wiley &- Foss, Inc. v. Saxony Theatres, Inc.,16 
the defendant's charter permitted it to operate, maintain and equip 
theaters. The plaintiff, a general contractor, which had previously 
done repairs on a theater owned by the defendant, was asked by one 
of the stockholder-officers to do similar work on another theater. The 
officer knew, but the plaintiff did not, that the second theater was 
owned by a different corporation, in which the officer also held stock. 
In defense of the plaintiff's action the defendant asserted that the con-
tract was ultra vires since it involved work performed for another cor-
poration and from which the defendant derived no benefit. 
10 L.R. 7 H.L. 653 (1875). 
11 Nowell v. Equitable Trust Co., 249 Mass. 585, 601, 144 N.E. 749, 754 (1924). 
12249 Mass. at 603, 144 N.E. at 755. 
13123 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1941). 
14 123 F.2d at 478. 
15 123 F.2d at 479. 
16335 Mass. 257, 139 N.E.2d 400 (1957). 
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The Court in permitting recovery pointed out that this was not an 
instance of the exercise of power "manifestly outside the general 
authority granted by ... [the] charter," 17 but rather it was a situation 
in which the general corporate authority was abused in the particular 
case. Thus the corporation had the authority to operate and repair 
theaters; the fact that the theater in question was not owned by the 
defendant made the contract an abuse of the general corporate author-
ity. And since the actual ownership of the theater was not known to 
the plaintiff, the defendant was not permitted to assert the defense of 
ultra vires. 
In making this ruling the Court did not expressly rule that the con-
tract was ultra vires, although it would appear that any corporate con-
tract from which the corporation cannot possibly derive any benefit 
must fall into that classification. On that premise the decision repre-
sents an exception to the general rules referred to above with reference 
to ultra vires contracts fully performed by one party. Thus even in a 
jurisdiction which follows the English doctrine, recovery on the con-
tract is permitted if the agreement falls within the general corporate 
purposes but is unauthorized solely because of an extrinsic fact (here 
the ownership of the theater) not known to the performing party. 
The decision in the Wiley case, however, does not represent a sharp 
break with tradition. In fact the Court relied on the leading case of 
Monument National Bank v. Globe Works,18 decided almost ninety 
years ago, in which the defense of ultra vires was unsuccessfully inter-
posed against a holder in due course of a promissory note. As in the 
Wiley case, the corporation had the general power to issue the note but 
an extrinsic fact unknown to the plaintiff (that the note was an ac-
commodation instrument) made issuance of the note unauthorized in 
the particular case. Although the Monument National Bank case in-
volved a negotiable instrument, the Court in Wiley readily extended 
the reasoning of the earlier decision to a situation involving an ordi-
nary contract.111 
In the second ultra vires decision of the 1957 SURVEY year the Court 
had even less difficulty in rejecting the defense. Wasserman v. National 
Gypsum CO.20 involved a situation in which the Shanley Lumber Cor-
poration had paid a debt owed by the Arey Company; the latter was 
one of Shanley's principal suppliers and was owned by the same stock-
holders. Upon the subsequent bankruptcy of Shanley its trustee in 
bankruptcy, asserting that the payment of Arey's debt was ultra vires, 
sued the creditor to recover the amount of the payment. In affirming 
a decision in favor of the defendant, the Supreme Judicial Court rested 
17 335 Mass. at 261, 139 N.E.2d at 402. 
18101 Mass. 57 (1869). 
111 A similar result was reached in Timberlake v. Supreme Commandery, United 
Order of the Golden Cross of the World, 208 Mass. 411, 94 N.E. 685 (1911), involv-
ing an allegedly ultra vires insurance contract. See also Ballantine, Corporations 
§97 (rev. ed. 1946). 
20 335 Mass. 240, 139 N.E.2d 410 (1957). 
3
Loewenberg: Chapter 16: Corporations
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1957
§16.2 CORPORATIONS 115 
its ruling on two principal grounds. First, the relationship between 
Shanley and Arey and the benefit to the former from the latter's con-
tinued operations justified the payment as within Shanley's corporate 
powers. Second, Arey had repaid Shanley for this advance, so that even 
if it had been an ultra vires expenditure, Shanley had been reimbursed 
and accordingly suffered no loss as a result of the payment. 
§16.2. Stockholder's right of inspection. Gavin v. Purdy,! al-
though by no means an unusual decision, serves as a reminder that a 
stockholder of a Massachusetts corporation has dual rights to examine 
corporate records and books of account. One right is a creature of 
statute; C.L., c. 155, §22 gives a stockholder a substantially unlimited 
right to inspect basic corporate organization papers, by-laws, records 
of stockholders' meetings and stockholders' lists. Books of account and 
other corporate records, however, are not covered by the statute. To 
inspect these the stockholder must rely on his rights under common 
law. 
In the Gavin case the stockholder petitioned for a writ of mandamus 
to compel the clerk of the corporation to permit her to examine the 
list of stockholders and all the books and records of the company. 
Since the stockholders' list was covered by the statute, the Court sus-
tained a demurrer to the petition on the ground that the petitioner 
should have invoked the statutory remedy, a bill in equity seeking 
appropriate relief. 
As to the other records, the petition indicated that the stockholder 
was primarily interested in certain allegedly improper payments of 
corporate funds. The demurrer was also sustained on the basis that 
the allegations were vague and indefinite and on the general ground 
that the petition was insufficient to warrant relief by mandamus. 
The broad scope of examination sought by the stockholder ("all 
books and records of the corporation") combined with the vagueness 
of her petition made the decision almost inevitable. The Court ac-
cordingly did not find it necessary to make an extensive review of the 
requirements for a successful mandamus petition to enforce the com-
mon law right of inspection. Instead it merely listed several familiar 
criteria: that the granting of relief is discretionary with the Court; 
that without such relief serious prejudice to the interests of the stock-
holder is likely to occur; that the stockholder's purpose must be 
honest, not merely speculative or vexatious; and that the effect upon 
the corporation in reference to competitors and others is not to be dis-
regarded. In brief, the Gavin case indicates a continuation of the 
Massachusetts doctrine that a stockholder who seeks to invoke his 
common law right of inspection must sustain a heavy burden of proof 
as to motive and purpose.2 
§16.2. 1335 Mass. 236, 139 N.E.2d 397 (1957). 
2 Cf. Albeev. Lamson & Hubbard Corp., 320 Mass. 421, 69 N.E.2d 811 (1946), 
in which the Court stressed that the burden of proving good faith and a proper 
purpose must be sustained by the petitioning stockholder. 
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